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Re: [LUG] sendmail rejects



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On Friday 09 July 2004 18:50, Simon Waters wrote:
about SPF and signing emails

I'm on thin ice in disagreeing on technical things with Simon, but I have been 
reading the SPF discussion list for quite some time now and I'm not sure the 
view presented is right.

I also think that the damage that spam does to email is not directly related 
to workload, it is more to the reduction in actual use of email by people who 
find the marginal irritation of even a few spams to be considerable and lack 
technical resources personally o rin a support department to deal with it.

Why not just sign all your emails - all the end user benefits (they know
it is from you can can discard the other emails claiming to be from you)
and none of the drawbacks of SPF.

Many of the people I exchange email with are insufficiently clued to handle 
signing, but that isn't what SPF is for.

The real problem here is insecure machines on the Internet, almost
universally running software from one company in Redmond. 
Of course.  

SPF transfers work from 1 to 3. 
Is that very much?  
I envisage setting up a rule that deletes unseen all email whcih claims to be 
from a domain which has implemented SPF and whose SPF record does not state 
that the machine from which the email came is one of that domain's email 
servers.
The designers of eg pobox.com who rather than being just large email systems 
are large email systems that relay mail for many mobile users - their worst 
problem - will have to establish either SMTP AUTH, a good idea for mobile 
users I'd say, and one that I'm going to be using now I can network into my 
mail servers, or envelope rewriting with SRS, something which I have acquired 
no understanding of as yet.

It doesn't solve the spam problem, and
it only partially address impersonation (unlike signing emails which
addresses this one properly).

It doesn't address impersonation at all.  The only thing it addresses by 
design is the spoofing of email from lines.  This solves one part of a large 
and complex (spam) problem, in a way that seems to me to be proportional and 
somewhat clever.
Screening out a large number of emails quickly on the basis that they are not 
from where they say they are allows more resource to be applied to the more 
clever and trickily sneaky spam.

Where as 3 is expensive. For the time cost of implementing SPF at a
small ISP - enable SMTP auth, educate users about SMTP Auth, update DNS,
update email servers, manage passwords.... you can probably upgrade the
email server hardware - which means an order of magnitude more email can
be handled.

I fear with the current growth of antisocial activity by those very few 
Americans (surely it is time their neighbours ceased to sell them groceries) 
and others adding the capacity to route more email will merely ensure that 
the huge rise in spam continues to be routed.  It is at least partly a social 
phenomenom, I was not active when Usenet sorted out a solution but I assume 
we can't blame Microsoft for all of that... even though their bhaviour on 
email and the Internet has been so poor as to suggest they want to destroy 
any internetwork they do not own, charge for and control.

Since SPF doesn't actually address the spam problem, it doesn't reduce
(2) significantly at least not until you switch on the "don't accept
email from non-SPF users" or those advertising all addresses (like AOL
was at one point - may still do) and that isn't happening anytime soon.

That was not my understanding, and of course if one adds even a single pointto 
the spamishness score on the basis of SPF records that don't allow an email 
to be discarded out of hand, it will make a big difference to the probability 
of a spam getting through.

Spam being a social problem will require a complex adjustment of society to 
deal with, SPF is one bit of technology I've been convinced of the merit of, 
and the various laws on UCE while poorly effective in their own right share 
the merit that they provide a criminal offence which has been committed by 
most senders of spam which cannot easily be blocked on the basis of where it 
came from.

- -- 
Adrian Midgley                   (Linux desktop)
GP, Exeter
http://www.defoam.net/
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